Vision-Based Localization Algorithm Based on Landmark Matching, Triangulation, Reconstruction, and Comparison

Many generic position-estimation algorithms are vulnerable to ambiguity introduced by nonunique landmarks. Also, the available high-dimensional image data is not fully used when these techniques are extended to vision-based localization. This paper presents the landmark matching, triangulation, reconstruction, and comparison (LTRC) global localization algorithm, which is reasonably immune to ambiguous landmark matches. It extracts natural landmarks for the (rough) matching stage before generating the list of possible position estimates through triangulation. Reconstruction and comparison then rank the possible estimates. The LTRC algorithm has been implemented using an interpreted language, onto a robot equipped with a panoramic vision system. Empirical data shows remarkable improvement in accuracy when compared with the established random sample consensus method. LTRC is also robust against inaccurate map data

Optimal bidding strategies for simultaneous Vickrey auctions with perfect substitutes

In this paper, we derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a model where all other bidders are local and participate in a single auction. For this case, we prove that, assuming free disposal, the global bidder should always place non-zero bids in all available auctions, irrespective of the local bidders’ valuation distribution. Furthermore, for nondecreasing valuation distributions, we prove that the problem of finding the optimal bids reduces to two dimensions. These results hold both in the case where the number of local bidders is known and when this number is determined by a Poisson distribution. In addition, by combining analytical and simulation results, we demonstrate that similar results hold in the case of several global bidders, provided that the market consists of both global and local bidders. Finally, we address the efficiency of the overall market, and show that information about the number of local bidders is an important determinant for the way in which a global bidder affects efficiency